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RECENT DECISIONS
Antitrust- Enforcement of Federal Trade Commission
Orders
On January 16, 1959 the Federal Trade Commission issued a cease
and desist order against Jantzen, Inc.. The FTC had charged that
Jantzen was violating section 2 (d) of the Clayton Act by granting
advantages to favored dealers. Jantzen consented to the issuance of
the order without admitting that any violation had occurred. In
1964 the Commission, believing that Jantzen was not complying
with the order, commenced proceedings in the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit to enforce the order. Jantzen contended that the
order was invalid, and that there was no method provided by law
for its enforcement. Held, dismissed: The court has no jurisdiction
to enforce the order. FTC v. Jantzen, Inc., 356 F2d 253 (9th Cir.
1966).
Federal Trade Commission orders can issue for violations of either
the Federal Trade Commission Act or the Clayton Act. Prior to 1938
the enforcement procedure was the same for orders under either act.
Enforcement was achieved by applying to a federal court of appeals
for a judicial decree ordering compliance. The initial order would be
issued by the FTC for the first violation committed. In order to
obtain a decree enforcing the FTC determination from the court of
appeals, a second violation had to be shown. Once granted, the decree
had the force and effect of an injunction, and if it was violated by a
third illegal act the offender could be found to be in contempt. This
enforcement procedure proved to be both time consuming and in-
effective. Therefore, in 1938 Congress attempted to revise and im-
prove this procedure by passage of the Wheeler-Lea Act.1 This act
amended section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, but did not
affect orders issued under the Clayton Act. In 1959 Congress passed
the Clayton Finality Act' to modify and improve the enforcement
procedure in regard to FTC orders issued for violations of the Clay-
ton Act. It was intended to be similar to the earlier Wheeler-Lea
Act. The Finality Act contained a paragraph relating to prior cases
in which the court of appeals had issued an enforcement decree, but,
unlike the Wheeler-Lea Act, it did not deal with cease and desist
orders for which no enforcement decrees had been issued.
1 52 Stat. 111 (1938).
273 Stat. 243, 15 U.S.C. 21 (1959).
RECENT DECISIONS
The failure to provide that such cease and desist orders would be-
come final under the new section of the Clayton Finality Act seems
to make all such orders presently unenforceable. As a consequence of
this anomaly, the Federal Trade Commission tried to take the posi-
tion that such cease and desist orders would, as provided in the
Wheeler-Lea Act, become final sixty days after passage of the Clay-
ton Finality Act. This contention was rejected in Sperry Rand Corp.
v. FTC. In the present case the FTC tried to go back and use the
earlier method of enforcement by applying to the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit for a decree enforcing the cease and desist
order against Jantzen. The Ninth Circuit has replied that the earlier
method is no longer available.
The instant decision has been the source of considerable concern
in the Federal Trade Commission. "[T]he Commission asserts that,
unless its views are accepted, 'forty-five years of Clayton Act en-
forcement and almost 400 orders to cease and desist would be wiped
from the books'."' To this argument the Court replied, "There is a
presumption that people obey the law; we would suppose that it
applies to obedience of FTC orders. The fact that there are 400
orders outstanding from forty-five years of enforcement, none of
which the Commission has yet sought to enforce, is somewhat per-
suasive that the presumption is a valid one."'
J.M. W.
Community Property - Probate Code Section 46
Williams v. McKnight
A husband and wife deposited $10,000 of community funds in
each of two bank accounts and a savings and loan account. Each
deposit agreement provided that the funds would be owned in joint
tenancy with right of survivorship. Upon the husband's death, the
executor sued the widow to recover one half of the funds in each
of the accounts which she had withdrawn after her husband's death.
The widow contended that the deposit agreements constituted a par-
tition of their community property under section 46 of the Probate
Code. That section provides "that any husband and his wife may, by
written agreement create a joint estate out of their community prop-
a288 F.2d 403 (1961).




erty with rights of survivorship."1 The trial court and the court of
civil appeals' sustained that contention. Held, reversed: Section 46 is
unconstitutional to the extent that it authorizes spouses to create by
agreement a joint tenancy with rights of survivorship out of their
community estate. Williams v. McKnight, 9 Tex. Sup. Ct. Jour.
376 (1966).
In 1948 the Texas Constitution was amended to allow partition of
community into separate property.' Pursuant to this amendment,
article 4624(a) established a method by which partition could be
accomplished.' In 1961 the supreme court held in Hilley v. Hilley'
that to create a joint tenancy with right of survivorship out of com-
munity property, the property must first be transmuted into separate
property prior to the agreement creating the joint tenancy. The leg-
islature responded to Hilley by amending section 46 of the Probate
Code' to allow joint tenancies with right of survivorship. The instant
case held that the attempt failed because the amendment did not pro-
vide for partition of the community property prior to the creation of
the joint tenancy and that the holding in Hilley was controlling.
At first glance the court's objection to section 46 seems to be based
on the narrow ground that the amendment did not contain the word
partition. More likely, however, the court was struck with the con-
tradiction which would arise from a construction of section 46 to
allow partition of community property into a joint tenancy. In fact
section 46 does not provide for a partition, and until there has been
a partition, the community property has not changed its character.
The importance of the concept of partition can be illustrated by sup-
posing that the husband's creditor attempted to garnish the funds in
the three accounts to satisfy the husband's obligation. There is little
doubt that the creditor would prevail as against a claim by the wife
that the agreemnt with the bank had partitioned the property and,
therefore, one half of the funds were her separate property. The
creditor need only point out that there had in fact been no partition.
The legislature has established procedures for partitioning com-
munity property. At present, the statutory formalities must be ob-
served, and the partition must be effective before spouses may create
joint tenancies with right of survivorship. Unquestionably the legis-
lature could provide easier methods of partition, but legislative intent
'TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 46 (1956).
2Williams v. McKnight, 391 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), Note, 19 Sw. L.J. 865
(1966).
'TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (1876).
4
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4624(a) (1960).
-Hilley v. Hilley, 161 Tex. 569, 342 S.W.2d 565 (1961).
'TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 46 (1956).
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to allow a division of the community must be clear before the court
will find a change in the fundamental nature of the community
estate.
J.L.P.
Discovery - Rule 186b - Limitations on Scope of
Examination
Martha King and her husband instituted a suit in trespass against
East Texas Salt Water Disposal. They alleged that oil in the reservoir
beneath a tract leased by them had been displaced by water injected
to the west of this tract by the defendant, rendering the wells on
their tract unproductive. To obtain evidence to support their alle-
gations, the Kings issued a subpoena duces tecum requiring the pro-
duction of certain documents in the possession of Philip J. Lehn-
hard, Field Chairman for East Texas Engineering Association, an
unincorporated association of certain producers in the East Texas
Field. Neither Lehnhard, Engineering, nor any members of Engineer-
ing were parties to the main action. The documents sought to be
produced consisted of reports, maps and data about the East Texas
Field, assembled over a period of years by the members of Engineer-
ing. Engineering's bylaws provide that these documents are for the
exclusive use of its members, and prohibit disclosure to nonmembers.
The Kings contended that these documents were not only the best
and most reliable source for the information sought, but that such
information was not available from any source except Engineering.
Lehnhard moved to quash the subpoena. District Judge David Moore
denied the motion to quash but ordered some restrictions on the data
which Lehnhard could be required to produce. Lehnhard then applied
for a writ of mandamus in the Texas Supreme Court. He alleged
that Judge Moore's orders constituted an abuse of discretion for
which a writ of mandamus may issue, because the documents sought
were not material and were confidential trade secrets which should be
protected under rule 186b.' Held, writ denied: When a trial judge
'TEx. R. Civ. P. ANN., 186b (1957).
After notice is served for taking a deposition on written interrogatories or
by oral examination, upon motion seasonably made by any party or by the
person to be examined and upon notice and for good cause shown, the court
in which the action is pending may make an order that the deposition shall
not be taken, or that it may be taken only before the court or at some desig-
nated place other than that stated in the notice or subpoena, or that it may
be taken only on written interrogatories, or that it may be taken only by oral
1966]
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determines that certain documents contain information which is
material and necessary to a cause of action before the court, a dis-
interested person who has possession of these documents may in the
discretion of the trial judge, be compelled to produce them. Lehn-
hard v. Moore, 9 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 279 (1966).
The basic purposes of discovery are to narrow the issues before
trial, to obtain evidence for use at the trial, and to secure informa-
tion as to the existence of evidence that may be used at the trial and
to ascertain how and from whom it may be procured.2 By amending
the discovery provisions of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the
supreme court has apparently implemented these broad purposes to
their fullest degree. Under the rules, any person, whether or not a
party, may be compelled to give a deposition or to produce docu-
ments and records about any matter not privileged. The information
sought must be relevant to one of the purposes of discovery. The
only express limitation upon the scope of discovery found in the
rules protects an attorney's work product and the results of investi-
gations by parties.' All other limitations are discretionary with the
trial judge.
A literal reading of the Texas discovery rules leaves it undisputed
that a disinterested person can be compelled to testify and to pro-
duce documents and records. The supreme court's discussion in
Lehnhard of the duty of a citizen to testify was merely in support
of the rules which the court had promulgated. In Lehnhard the court
upheld an order requiring a totally disinterested person to disclose
information which although pertinent was not directly connected
with the facts before the court. In so doing, the court brought
Texas clearly in line with the liberal discovery practices of the fed-
eral courts,4 and demonstrated an unwillingness to prescribe any
boundaries upon the discretionary authority of the trial judge.
D.E.W.
examination, or that certain matters shall not be inquired into, or that the
examination shall be held with no one present except the witness and his coun-
sel and the parties to the action and their officers and counsel, or that the de-
position shall not be taken by or before the officer having the commission, or
that after being sealed the deposition shall be opened only by order of the
court, or that secret processes, developments or research need not be disclosed,
or that the parties shall simultaneously file specified documents or information
enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court; or the
court may make any other order which justice requires to protect the party
or witness from undue annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or expense.
22A BARRON AND HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 641 (1961).
3 TEx. R. Civ. P. ANN. 186a (1957).
4 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Hartley Pen Co. v. United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of California, Central Division, 287 F.2d 324 (9th
Cir. 1961).
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Habeas Corpus - State May Waive Requirement that
Applicant Exhaust Available State Remedies
The appellant, Tolg, was arrested during a civil rights sit-in and
convicted of violating a Georgia anti-trespass statute. Tolg's motion
to arrest the judgment and his motion for new trial by which he at-
tacked the constitutionality of the statute were overruled. Tolg did
not file a bill of exceptions within the allowed time period, but the
failure was not due to a willful intention to bypass state appellate
procedure. Nor did appellant file a petition for state habeas corpus
prior to the filing of his application for federal habeas corpus. A de-
cision subsequent to Tolg's petition1 for federal habeas corpus, Hamm
v. City of Rock Hill,' giving the Civil Rights Act of 19643 retro-
active effect, arguably gave Tolg a state remedy not available at the
time he filed his habeas corpus petition. The attorneys for the State
of Georgia4 conceded that nothing would be gained by requiring
Tolg to seek this remedy in the state courts.! Held: The state may
waive a habeas corpus applicant's failure to exhaust available state
remedies if it recognizes, as it did here, that substantial justice will
be furthered by such waiver. Tolg v. Grimes, 355 F.2d 92 (5th Cir.
1966).'
Section 2254 of title 28 of the United States Code' states in per-
tinent part as follows: 'An application for a writ of habeas corpus
. . . shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State. . . ."' The
courts have consistently held that if a state prisoner has exhausted
all the existing state remedies, but prior to the time he files for
federal habeas corpus the Supreme Court makes a ruling which may
change the state courts' policy toward the applicant's conviction, the
'United States ex rel. Tolg v. Grimes, 229 F. Supp. 289 (N.D. Ga. 1964). The court
there found the petition to be without merit. This was prior to the Hamm decision, note 2
infra.
2379 U.S. 306 (1964).
'78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C. 2000a (1964).
4 Grimes, the appellee, is the sheriff of Fulton County, Georgia.
The state said, "nothing would be gained by consuming the time and energy of counsel
and the court by procedural shadow-boxing." Tolg v. Grimes, 35s F.2d 92, 97 (5th Cir.
1966).
e The new remedy arose after appellant filed his habeas corpus petition, and the court
stated that the right of the petitioner to proceed in federal district court must be deter-
mined as of the time the petition was filed. Id. at 98. The case was disposed of under the
reasoning of Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964), that if a conviction which
is still pending is unconstitutional, as Tolg's was, it is void and of no effect. Tolg, 355 F.2d
at 99.
'28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1964).
'The statute continues to provide: "An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted
the remedies available in the courts of the State . . . if he has the right under the law of
the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented."
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applicant has an additional state remedy which he must exhaust be-
fore the federal district court can consider his habeas corpus petition.!
Frequently, however, the available state remedy is narrowly con-
strued," and the exhaustion of state remedies is but a futile technical-
ity for gaining entry into the federal district court. The state, and the
petitioner if he has hired counsel, therefore, is required to spend time
and money presenting these cases to the state courts, although the
case probably will return to the federal court once the formal need
for exhaustion has been met.
If the state is reasonably certain that the petitioner cannot obtain
relief in the state court, it can save itself the time and expense of
defending the action by waiving the exhaustion requirement-allow-
ing the federal district court to make immediate disposition of the
case.1 The majority of the court in ToIg reasoned that since the prin-
ciple of exhaustion is a matter of comity and not a matter of juris-
diction, the state may waive exhaustion." But did Congress intend to
place the decision in the hands of state attorneys or did it intend for
the applicant to get his answer as to whether a state remedy is avail-
able only from the state courts or the state statutes? This sparked
Judge Bell to write a vigorous dissent. Judge Bell read section 2254
literally: "this statute speaks in terms of '. . . shall not grant . ..'
and it contains no provision whereby counsel or a party may invest
the court with authority to grant the writ."''. "Now the lawyers will
decide which court may act.""
If there is a state remedy presently available, and if the state de-
mands that the federal habeas applicant exhaust this remedy, the
'Blair v. California, 340 F.2d 741, 745 (9th Cir. 1965); and cf. Cyronne-DeVirgin
v. Missouri, 341 F.2d 568 (8th Cir. 1965). Contra if the state courts recognize the new right
but refuse to give it retroactive effect. United States ex rel. Mancini v. Rundle, 337 F.2d
268, 271 (3d Cir. 1964).
10 In Georgia, state habeas corpus generally is not available to raise an issue which has
been foreclosed by failure to raise a timely appeal. See Cobb v. Balkcom, 339 F.2d 95 (5th
Cir. 1964). In Texas, habeas corpus usually is available only to test a conviction under an
invalid law or under no law at all. See Ex pare Wynn, 158 Tex. Crim. 665, 259 S.W.2d
191 (1953); Cofer, Observations on Habeas Corpus and Post-Conviction Relief in State and
Federal Courts, 28 Tux. B.J. 947, 996 (1965).
1 There are other reasons why the state may prefer to have the federal court decide
prior to the exhaustion of state remedies: it may believe it can win on the merits, or it may
feel that the petitioner has a valid claim and should receive prompt relief. It must be re-
membered that Tolg will apply only when justice will be furthered by such waiver, and
financial reasons alone would not meet this test.
1 Some years ago Mr. Justice Rutledge argued for the same type of result: The absolute
requirement of exhaustion of state remedies "would be nothing less than abdication of our
constitutional duty and would function to rebuff petitioners with this mechanical formula
whenever it may become clear that the alleged state remedy is nothing but a procedural
morass offering no substantial hope of relief." Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 564 (1947)
(concurring opinion).
1 3 5 5 F.2d at 100.14 Ibid.
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federal district judge undoubtedly will give the state courts the first
opportunity to act upon the claim. Even if the state does wish to
waive the requirement of exhaustion, the federal district judge may
deny the state's request because he feels substantial justice will not
be furthered by such waiver.
The result in Tolg does not increase federal-state frictions since
the waiver of exhaustion is placed in the hands of state officials.
On the other hand, the states may be tempted to shirk their respon-
sibility to provide adequate state post-conviction relief.
J.B.H.
Procedure - Finality of Judgements - Appeal
ALDRIDGE was sued by the North East Independtnt School District
for the breach of a construction contract. Aldridge claimed that he
acted only as agent in executing the contract, and that his principal
was King-O-Hills Development Company. With the permission of the
trial court, Aldridge filed a cross-action against King-O-Hills to
recover any sum which he might be adjudged liable to pay to the
School District. The trial court held that Aldridge was liable for
damages. In the judgment no mention was made of the cross-action
against King-O-Hills. Aldridge's appeal from the trial court's judg-
ment was dismissed by the court of civil appeals on the ground that
the judgment appealed from was not final in that no disposition was
made of the cross-action.' Held, reversed: "When a judgment, not in-
trinsically interlocutory in character, is rendered and entered in a
case regularly set for a conventional trial on the merits, no order for
a separate trial of issues having been entered pursuant to Rule 174
... it will be presumed for appeal purposes that the Court intended
to, and did, dispose of all parties legally before it and of all issues
made by the pleading between such parties." The judgment appealed
from was final. North East Independent School District v. Aldridge,
400 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. 1966).
The early Texas rule for determining the finality of judgments was
that "the judgment must in substance show intrinsically, and not in-
ferentially, that the matters in the record had been determined in
favor of one of the litigants, or the rights of the parties in litiga-




tion had been adjudicated." 2 This rule was changed in favor of a
presumption that the trial court had disposed of all issues in the
pleadings.' Some confusion existed with regard to whether the pre-
sumption extended to the manner in which the issues were disposed
of, e.g., whether a particular issue was denied or dismissed Under
the rule established in the instant case, the presumption is only that
the trial court disposed of the issues and the parties before it.
The court expressly made the rule subject to the exception created
by Davis v. McCray Refrigerator Sales Corp.' The exception is stated:
"It will not be presumed that a judgment dismissing a plaintiff's
suit on non-suit, plea to the jurisdiction, plea in abatement, for want
of prosecution, etc., also disposed of the issues in an independent
cross-action." The problem of finality of judgments is usually crea-
ted by careless draftmanship. The presumption that the trial court
disposed of all the issues and parties before it is a logical one. On the
other hand the presumption is not applicable in the Davis situation
because "if the trial court intended to retain the cross-action for
further consideration, it would have entered the very judgment
which it did enter in granting a non-suit.' The use of the presumption
established in this case should remove much of the confusion in de-
termining when a judgment is final for purposes of appeal.
G.M.L.
Procedure- Time Limits for Perfecting Appeals
Frizzel brought suit against Puckett to reform a deed. The trial
court granted judgment for the plaintiff. Notice of appeal was con-
tained in the judgment entered on November 13. On November 20,
the defendant filed a motion for new trial which was overruled on
December 17. On January 14, within thirty days from the overrul-
ing of the motion for new trial but not within thirty days from
entry of judgment containing the notice of appeal, the defendant put
up cash in lieu of an appeal bond. On February 25, the court of civil
appeals granted the appellant an additional twenty days within which
to file the record. The record was filed on March 8, within the twenty-
'Linn v. Arambould, 55 Tex. 611, 619 (1881).
'Trammell v. Rosen, 106 Tex. 132, 157 S.W. 1161 (1913).
4 Burton Lingo Co. v. First Baptist Church of Abilene, 222 S.W. 203 (Tex. Comm. App.
1920).
5136 Tex. 296, 150 S.W.2d 377 (1941).
' North East Independent School District v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. 1966).
7 Id. at 897.
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day extension. The court of civil appeals dismissed the appeal for
want of jurisdiction because the appeal bond and the record were not
timely filed.' The question before the supreme court was whether
the dismissal of the appeal was proper. Held, reversed: Where the
judgment contains a notice of appeal and there is a motion for new
trial which is overruled, the time limits for posting an appeal bond,
or cash in lieu of a bond, and for filing the record run from the order
overruling the motion for new trial. Puckett v. Frizzell, 9 Tex. Sup
Ct. Jour. 347 (1966).
Timely filing of the appeal bond is jurisdictional." Rule 356 re-
quires that a cost bond or cash in lieu of bond be filed "within thirty
days after rendition of judgment or order overruling motion for new
trial. . . ."' Rule 306(c) provides that every notice of appeal is con-
sidered filed "on the date of . . . the rendition of judgment . . .. or
from the date of the overruling of motion for new trial, if such mo-
tion is filed." 4 The court of civil appeals reasoned that the notice of
appeal would date from the overruling of a motion for new trial if an
additional notice of appeal had been given. The supreme court ob-
served that while the notice of appeal was only an appeal from the
judgment rendered and not an appeal from the overruling of the
motion for new trial, nevertheless, the notice of appeal given at the
time of judgment was effective for purposes of the time limits from
the time of the overruling of the motion for new trial.
An appellant to perfect an appeal must timely file a notice of ap-
peal and a bond.' Certainty is required in the rules in order that an
appellant is not deprived of his rights because of confusion with
regard to when the time limits begin to run. The decision in the in-
stant case clarifies language in the rules which is subject to varying
interpretations and provides a definitive construction.
G.M.L.
Restitution - Defaulting Purchaser
Plaintiff contracted to purchase a tract of land from the defend-
ant. While no payments had been made on time, by July 6, 1961 the
plaintiff had paid $1,070 of the $1,500 consideration promised. This
'Puckett v. Frizzell, 396 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
2Hamilton v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., 134 Tex. 377, 110 S.W.2d 561 (1937).
'TEx. R. Civ. P. 353(a).
4
TEX. R. Civ. P. 306(c).
5 See note 4 supra.
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left a balance of $430 unpaid and overdue since April 1, 1961. On
February 1, 1962 the defendant conveyed the land by general war-
ranty deed to a bona fide purchaser' for a consideration of $1,300.
Plaintiff brought an action seeking restitution for the payments of
$1,070 made under the contract. The trial court awarded the plain-
tiff $1,070 plus interest from the date of sale by the defendant to
the bona fide purchaser. On appeal, the defendant contended that the
plaintiff had defaulted on the contract since he had made his pay-
ments late, and therefore, all of the payments were forfeited. Held,
affirmed as modified: Where the vendor elects to exercise his power
to terminate a contract for the sale of land, he is entitled to damages
for the breach of the contract. The defaulting purchaser is entitled
under equitable principles to restitution of the purchase money paid
diminished by the damages suffered by the vendor. De Leon v.
Aldrete, 398 S.W. 2d 160 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
The majority of the jurisdictions in this country, departing from
the English rule that a defaulting purchaser is entitled to recover
payments made to the vendor under the contract,' hold that upon
effective termination by the vendor, all payments by the defaulting
purchaser are forfeited.' The rationale of this rule is that a vendee
should not be able to create his own cause of action for restitution
due to his own breach of the purchase contract.4 The harshness of
the rule, however, has caused many courts to seize upon any plausible
ground available to avoid it, particularly where the purchaser's default
was not willful.'
In the instant case the court recognized some broad language in the
Texas decisions' which indicated a commitment to the forfeiture rule,
but pointed out that the better Texas authority7 recognizes that the
'The contract between plaintiff and defendant was not recorded, and the plaintiff never
took possession of the land.
2Palmer v. Temple, 9 Ad. & El. 508, 112 Eng. Reprint 1304 (1839). The rationale of
the rule is that when the contract is abandoned on both sides, the idea of payment is neces-
sarily abandoned. The vendor is then in the situation of retaining money under circumstances
not provided for, and thus holds the money to the use of the vendee. This rule does not
apply to "earnest" money.
3Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 8, 11-12 (1953).
'Ibid. See also Estes v. Browning, 11 Tex. 237 (1853).
'Tucker v. Beam, 343 Ill. App. 290, 98 N.E.2d 871 (1951); Malberg v. Baugh, 62
Utah 331, 218 P. 975 (1923).
6Tom v. Wollhoefer, 61 Tex. 277 (1884); Estes v. Browning, 11 Tex. 237 (1853);
Magruder v. Poulton, 257 S.W. 533 (Tex. Comm. App. 1924).
'Lipscomb v. Fugua, 103 Tex. 585, 131 S.W. 1061 (1910). In this case, after paying
$10,000, which was to be forfeited upon failure to perform, plaintiff took possession of the
land. Plaintiff later defaulted on the payments due and defendant, vendor, evicted him. The
court stated that whether a vendor who "rescinds" an executory contract for the sale of
land shall return the purchase money paid depends on the equities of each case. Here no
equities were found in plaintiff's favor. See also Miller v. Horn, 149 S.W. 769 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1912); Fink v. Hough, 153 S.W. 676 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) error ref. Cf. Sparen-
burg v. Collins, 63 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
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vendor may be required to make restitution, depending on the equities
of each case. The court considered an absolute rule of forfeiture com-
pletely unreasonable because it disregards the amount of damage suf-
fered by the vendor. Also, the payments forfeited by the purchaser
increase as the seriousness of his breach decreases.
The court pointed out that the purchaser's breach did not in itself
terminate the contract, and his right to restitution cannot arise unless
the vendor elects to reject his remedies of specific performance or
foreclosure and exercises his power to terminate the contract for all
purposes. If the vendor chooses to terminate and thus disable himself
from performing under the contract, equity requires, at least in the
absence of a forfeiture clause, that the vendor hold the payments
made to the use of the purchaser subject to allowance for proper
damages. Here the defendant was found to be damaged to the extent
of $200, the difference between the contract price of $1,500, and the
sale price of $1,300. The vendor's damages were fixed at the date of
sale to the third party. The purchaser recovered $870 which consisted
of his payments of $1,070 diminished by $200 plus interest from
the date that the vendor terminated the contract.
A surprisingly small amount of litigation has arisen in this area.
One reason may be a preference of vendors to affirm the contract and
to sue for specific performance or to seek foreclosure.8 Another seem-
ingly apparent reason would be the inclusion of a forefeiture clause
in the contract. Whether such a clause automatically precludes resti-
tution is not certain. The court in the instant case, while not pre-
sented with the question, suggests that a forfeiture clause would con-
trol.' However, there is authority which indicates that a forfeiture
clause would not control if the equities were in favor of the default-
ing purchaser."
R.B.D.
Taxation - Grant of Formulas - Ordinary Income
James H. Pickren and Arthur Hooker were joint owners of certain
secret formulas and trade names that were indisputably capital assets
in their hands. In 1957 they entered into a contract granting Freit
Laboratories, Inc. "the exclusive right and license, for a period of
'See Huddle v. Cleveland, 297 S.W.2d 737, 740 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957), for a discussion
of the remedies available to the vendor.
9 398 S.W.2d 160, 164 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
10 See note 7 supra.
1966]
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twenty-five years" to manufacture the products derived from the
formulas and the right to use the trade names. Pickren included
amounts received from Freit under this contract as long term capi-
tal gains in his tax returns for 1959, 1960 and 1961. The Commis-
sioner asserted that these payments represented ordinary income be-
cause there had been no "sale" of a capital asset.' Held: Since the full
rights to the formula and trade names would revert to the taxpayer
at the expiration of twenty-five years, the taxpayer had not com-
pleted a sale of all substantial rights in the assets. Therefore, the tax-
payer must report his proceeds as ordinary income. Pickren v. United
States 249 F. Supp. 560 (D.C. Fla. 1965).
Although this was a case of first impression, prior cases concerning
patents furnish an excellent analogy. The crucial question in deter-
mining if the taxpayer has ordinary income or capital gains is
whether there has been a "sale." The decisions in Estate of Gowdey
v. Commissioner' and Thomas D. Armour v. Commissioner' appear
to set out the controlling principles in delineating a "sale" involving
patent rights or trade names. In the Gowdey case the taxpayer ob-
tained a limited patent license for a product called "Dairy Queen."
Gowdey then entered into fourteen "Franchise Agreements" for
various territories in Virginia. Each licensee received in perpetuity
the exclusive rights to use the patented machine, to use the name
"Dairy Queen" and, to prepare and sell the secret-mix frozen pro-
duct in a specified territory. By express provision in the agreement,
Gowdey retained title to all machines. The Tax Court found that
these agreements were not sales but rather mere licenses and there-
fore Gowdey's proceeds were ordinary income.' The Fourth Circuit
reversed and held that these exclusive rights were capable of sale
without also selling the machines and had in fact been sold thereby
entitling the taxpayer to capital gains. The court stated, "A predom-
inant factor in our determination-that the franchise agreements
accomplished a sale-is that the privileges were transferred in per-
petuity."'
The decision in Armour illustrates the other side of the coin. In
that case the taxpayer sold the exclusive right, license and privilege
to use the name "Tommy Armour" as a trade mark on golf balls.
This privilege, initially granted for a term of years, was to exist
"from this date forth." The Tax Court decided that the taxpayer
1
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 1222(3).
2307 F.2d 816 (4th Cir. 1962).
322 T.C. 181 (1954).4 Estate of G. R. Gowdey, 1961 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 5 61,112 (1961).
307 F.2d at 820.
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had not granted the perpetual right to use his name and therefore
the proceeds were ordinary income.
The Pickren case is the first decision to apply the "sale" test to a
secret formula situation. Apparently the most important factor in
meeting this test is that some right be granted "in perpetuity." Could
it be argued that a transfer for a term of years would be a sale of
all or substantially all of the rights in a secret formula if the interest
retained was of insubstantial value? The court's opinion in Pickren
leaves this question unanswered.
J.M.W.
Taxation - Section 1221 (1) - Property Held Primar-
ily for Sale
William Malat was a participant in a joint venture which acquired
a forty-five acre parcel of land. Because of difficulties in developing
the property, the joint venturers sold their interests in part of the
acreage and reported the proceeds as long-term capital gains. At the
time of acquisition and during the period the property was held, the
participants had a dual purpose of either developing the land as rental
property and holding it as an investment, or developing the land for
sale, whichever would be more profitable. A deficiency was assessed
by the Commisisoner who asserted that the property was held "pri-
marily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or
business," 1 and therefore was not a capital asset. The taxpayer paid
the assessment and sued for a refund. The district court sustained the
Commissioner, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari "to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals
with regard to the meaning of the term 'primarily' as it is used in
§ 1221 (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954." Held, vacated
and remanded: "As used in § 1221 (1), 'primarily' means 'of first
importance' or 'principally.'" Malat v. Riddell, 86 Sup. Ct. 1030
(1966).
Section 1221(1) reads, "For purposes of this subtitle, the term
'capital asset' means property held by the taxpayer (whether or not
connected with his trade or business), but does not include-(1) ...
property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of his trade or business." The courts of appeals have
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1221(1).
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interpreted "primarily" in two ways. The Second2 and the Ninth3
Circuits have construed it to mean "substantially." Thus, if a tax-
payer acquired and held property for the dual purpose of investment
and for sale to customers, under the substantial test the property was
held primarily for sale, and therefore was not a capital asset. The
Fifth' and Eighth 'Circuits have followed a construction which was
adopted by the Supreme Court in the instant case. In Municipal Bond
Corporation v. Commissioners the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed a Tax Court finding that "while the sales purpose,
in some instances may not have been predominant over the invest-
ment purpose, it was, nevertheless, substantial throughout the entire
period under review." The court said that the Tax Court should
have based its finding "on a determination of the primary or pre-
dominant purpose of taxpayer in acquiring and holding the proper-
ties."
The Supreme Court reasoned that "primarily" should be interpre-
ted in its "ordinary, everyday sense." While the holding is expressly
limited to section 1221 (1), it seems likely that the same meaning of
"primarily" is intended in section 1231 (relating to property used in
trade or business and involuntary conversions) and section 1237
(relating to real property subdivided for sale). At the same time, the
Court made no attempt to resolve other difficulties in section 1221 (1).
For example the phrase "in the ordinary course of . . . business" has
been the subject of varying interpretations. Malat, however, may be
construed as placing the emphasis on the taxpayer's intent during the
holding period. If the courts of appeals adopt this construction, cases
which have concerned themselves with the extent of the taxpayer's
activities at the time of sale will lose their vitality."
G.M.L.
Taxation - Subchapter S - Classes of Stock
Gamman and Reese, petitioners, organized Century House, Inc.,
which was incorporated in Washington on October 15, 1959, to con-
'American Can Co. v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 604 (2d Cir. 1963).
'Rollingwood Corp. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1951).
4 United States v. Bennett, 186 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1961).
'Municipal Bond Corp. v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1965).
6 Ibid.
7See Achong v. Commissioner, 246 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1957); Palos Verdes Corp. v.




struct a motel near the site of the World's Fair in Seattle. Petitioners
were equal owners of all the 400 outstanding shares of no-par common
stock of the corporation. The corporation's books showed paid-in
capital of $400 for the years in question.' At the end of 1961 the
petitioners had advanced $165,670.80 to the corporation; by the
end of 1962 they had advanced a total of $252,343.80 in approxi-
mately equal amounts from each. These advances were evidenced
by six per cent demand notes, on which petitioners had waived the
interest due and had made no demand for payment. On January 25,
1961 Century House with the consent of all its shareholders filed an
election under subchapter S.2 In 1961 and 1962 Gamman and Reese
claimed as deductions on their individual income tax returns their
pro rata share of the operating losses of Century House. The Com-
missioner disallowed the deductions on the ground that the advances
made by petitioners to the corporation constituted a second class of
stock, as a result of which Century House did not qualify as a small
business corporation under section 1371 (a) of the Code.' Held: The
notes although representing equity or risk capital did not give the
holders of the notes any rights and interests in the corporation differ-
ent from their rights and interests as owners of all the capital stock
of the corporation. Therefore, the notes did not constitute a second
class of stock. W. C. Gamman, 46 T.C.-No. 1 (1966).
The Commissioner's argument that the promissory notes issued to
the shareholders in return for their advances to the corporation actual-
ly constituted a six per cent preferred nonvoting stock was based on
the provision that "if an instrument purporting to be a debt obliga-
tion is actually stock, it will constitute a second class of stock."'
Section 1731 (a) of the Code defines the term "small business cor-
poration" inter alia, as a domestic corporation which does not have
more than one class of stock. The Tax Court nullified the regulation
relied on by the Commissioner because it was too broad and placed
"a restriction on the stockholders of electing corporations which was
not intended by Congress." The court went on and looked at "the
realities of the situation" to determine that the advances were addi-
' The years in question here are 1961 and 1962. From the date of incorporation, in Octo-
ber 1959, to January 1960, there was another stockholder of the corporation, but in 1960
he was bought out by the corporation which also paid off his advances without interest. In
1964 the corporation recapitalized and a substantial portion of the advances made by the
stockholders was converted into additional stock, bonds, and paid-in capital of the corpora-
tion. However, the court limited its consideration to the facts and circumstances as they
existed in 1961 and 1962.2 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1372(a).
'All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 unless otherwise in-
dicated.
4Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1958).
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tions to capital which were "placed at the risk of the business just
the same as the amounts petitioners paid for the capital stock." How-
ever, it did not matter in this case that the advances were additions
to capital rather than loans because the instruments did not give the
petitioners any rights and interests in the income and assets of the
corporation different from the rights and interests they had as owners
of all the capital stock. Any preferences given by the notes were
preferences only over the noteholders themselves as stockholders.
Thus, the court held that Century House did not have more than
one class of stock within the meaning of section 1371.
Five judges concurred in the result and five judges dissented. Three
who concurred thought that there was only one class of stock but
that the regulation required this conclusion. They thought that the
notes "were not 'actually stock' under any theory" because under
the regulation "the elements of character of the so-called debt obliga-
tion must be the same as the elements characterizing a share of stock."
The two other concurring judges said that the legislative history
showed that the single class of stock requirement was imposed to avoid
the necessity for complex rules of allocation. Therefore, they thought
the second class of stock doctrine, as stated in the regulations, was
inconsistent with the intent of Congress and might produce grave
inequities that were not contemplated. The five dissenters thought
that the instruments did establish different rights and liabilities from
those associated with the corporation's common stock even though
there was no intention to enforce the notes according to their terms.
They felt that the notes resembled cumulative, nonparticipating, re-
deemable preferred stock, and that if they had been so labeled, there
would have been no question that they constituted a second class
of stock.
W. C. Gamman' should be read together with three recent cases
dealing with the same issue.' In Catalina Homes, Inc." the court held
that advances constituted a second class of stock for purposes of
section 1371 (a). There the court found that the advances were not
represented by notes or any other evidence of indebtedness, that
interest was payable as determined by the board of directors, that
there was "thin incorporation," and that the advances were pre-
ferred over the no-par common stock to the extent that dividends
could not be paid on the no-par common stock until the advances
5 46 T.C. __, No. 1 (1966).
0 The issue in each case was whether advances made to the corporation constituted a
second class of stock and therefore disqualified the corporation's subchapter S election under
section 1372(a).
"23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 225 (1964).
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plus interest had been paid in full. However, the court did not look
at "the realities of the situation" to determine whether the advances
by the shareholders actually gave them any rights and interests dif-
ferent from their rights and interests as holders of the common stock.
In Seven Sixty Ranch Co. v. Kennedy' a district court held that notes
given by the corporation to its sole shareholder evidencing loans made
by him to the corporation did not constitute a second class of stock.
There the court found that the shareholder had actually created a
genuine debtor-creditor relationship between himself and the cor-
poration; and that he did not acquire, by virtue of having made the
loans to the corporation, an advantage or superior right to participate
in the management of the corporation as he was at all times the sole
operator and manager. The reasoning here seems to be the same as
that of W. C. Gamman, in that the court thought that any prefer-
ences given by the notes were preferences only over the noteholder
himself as the sole stockholder. In Henderson v. United States,' now
on appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the district court found that the ad-
vances represented a capital investment rather than a debt invest-
ment and held that the instruments evidencing the advances consti-
tuted a second class of stock. There, as in W. C. Gamman, there was
no attempt by the noteholder to enforce the instruments in accord-
ance with their terms. Other factors lead the court to the conclusion
that the loans were intended to be equity or risk capital.
Any further action by the Commissioner in this area will probably
await the outcome of the appeal of Henderson in the Fifth Circuit.
While no prediction of the outcome will be made, it seems that the
result reached by the Tax Court in W. C. Gamman is more in line
with the intent of Congress in providing the subchapter S election
for "small businesses," to permit them "to select the form of business
organization desired, without the necessity of taking into account
major differences in tax consequences.""0
W.T.H.
8 CCH 1966 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 5 9293 (66-1 U.S. Tax Cas.) (D. Wyo. 1966).
9245 F. Supp. 782 (D. Ala. 1965), appeal docketed (5th Cir.).
10 S. Rep. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4876 (1958); 1958-3 Cum. Bull. 1008;
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